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THE ‘PRICE’ OF JUSTICE?  
COSTS-CONDITIONAL SPECIAL LEAVE IN THE 
HIGH COURT 
KI E R A N  P E N D E R   
This article considers the High Court of Australia’s occasional practice of granting special 
leave to appeal on a costs-conditional basis, whereby the appellant pays the respondent’s 
costs regardless of the outcome. Despite the dissonance between this practice and 
traditional costs principles, there is little academic or judicial reflection on costs-
conditional special leave. While several policy considerations support this practice, it is 
not unproblematic. What factors guide the exercise of this discretion? Why must an 
ultimately successful appellant fund the litigation? Should a party’s financial status be a 
relevant consideration? If the Court is willing to depart from traditional costs rules here, 
why not elsewhere? This article uses quantitative and qualitative frameworks to consider 
such issues. 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N 
[Prior to a special leave hearing, the appellant in Freidin v St Laurent had 
offered to pay the respondent’s appeal costs in any event if leave was granted.] 
Kirby J: Mr Casey, it is rather ungracious of you to reject all this money that the 
applicant is bringing to Court trying to buy its way into the High Court of Aus-
tralia. 
… 
Mr Casey: We have not seen any buckets yet, your Honour.1 
From time to time, the High Court of Australia grants special leave to appeal 
on the condition that the appellant pays the respondent’s appeal costs in any 
event and undertakes not to disturb costs orders below. This is unusual. Costs 
typically follow the event,2 and Australian courts have resisted departing from 
 
 1 Transcript of Proceedings, Freidin v St Laurent [2007] HCATrans 251, 366–72. 
 2 See, eg, Donald Campbell & Co Ltd v Pollak [1927] AC 732, 811–12 (Viscount Cave LC); 
Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534, 569 (McHugh J). The principle that costs follow the 
event has a long history. One jurist writes: ‘The rule appears to have its origins in the thir-
teenth century, when the Statute of Gloucester 1275 gave plaintiffs a right to certain costs in 
specified real property actions. The “loser pays” principle was gradually extended over the 
 
2018] Costs Conditional Leave in the High Court 151 
the traditional principle in a range of contexts.3 Why should an appellant bear 
the entire costs of a dispute if they are ultimately successful in the High 
Court? It is not far-fetched to suggest that, in complex cases fought out across 
several fora, the price could reach seven figures, as the appellant is unable to 
recover its own costs and is liable for the respondent’s costs. Counsel in one 
such case quipped: ‘Justice does not come cheap.’4 
Yet the High Court’s practice is not without compelling policy justifica-
tions. Costs-conditional special leave is typically imposed where the appellant 
is a deep-pocketed public or commercial party with a broader interest in the 
disputed jurisprudence, while the respondent is an individual concerned 
solely with the litigation at hand. Requiring this condition thereby allows the 
Court to fulfil its law-developing role at the apex of the Australian judicial 
system without ‘burdening other parties swept along in expensive litigation’.5 
When a ‘large and recurrent litigant’, such as an insurer or the Commissioner 
of Taxation, seeks to change the law ‘in order to vindicate their long-term 
commercial [or public] interests’, it seems entirely reasonable for special leave 
to be conditioned on this basis.6 The practice may also have desirable conse-
quences: the respondent is financially empowered to retain eminent senior 
counsel (to the benefit of the Court), and will be disinclined to settle safe in 
the knowledge that they are protected from adverse costs. 
A review of the High Court’s costs-conditional special leave practice is 
overdue. To the author’s knowledge, it has never been previously considered 
in any depth in academic literature. Nor has it been the subject of much 
introspection by the Court. In one of the few judgments to consider the 
practice, Oshlack v Richmond River Council (‘Oshlack’), the Court split on its 
 
centuries until in modern times it applies generally to all litigation subject to [certain excep-
tions]’: Geoffrey Woodroffe, ‘Loser Pays and Conditional Fees: An English Solution?’ (1998) 
37(2) Washburn Law Journal 345, 345. 
 3 See, eg, Australasian Centre for Corporate Responsibility v Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
(2016) 248 FCR 280, 294–5 [74]–[75] (Allsop CJ, Foster and Gleeson JJ); Qantas Airways Ltd 
v Cameron [No 3] (1996) 68 FCR 387, 389 (Lindgren and Lehane JJ) (‘Qantas Airways’); Gary 
Cazalet, ‘Unresolved Issues: Costs in Public Interest Litigation in Australia’ (2010) 29(1)  
Civil Justice Quarterly 108, 119. But see Kent v Cavanagh (1973) 1 ACTR 43, 55–6 (Fox J);  
Ruddock v Vadarlis [No 2] (2001) 115 FCR 229, 242 [29] (Black CJ and French J) (‘Ruddock v  
Vadarlis’). 
 4 Transcript of Proceedings, CSR Ltd v Thompson [2004] HCATrans 544, 132–3  
(MJ Joseph). 
 5 Justice Michael Kirby, ‘Maximising Special Leave Performance in the High Court of 
Australia’ (2007) 30(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 731, 750. 
 6 CSR Ltd v Eddy (2005) 226 CLR 1, 35 [80]–[81] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ) 
(‘CSR v Eddy’). 
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ramifications.7 There is also disagreement as to the practice’s frequency and 
nature. It has variously been described as ‘rare’,8 ‘occasional’9 and occurring 
‘quite frequently’,10 while views differ as to whether the condition is ordinarily 
‘volunteered’ by the appellant,11 sought by the respondent, or ‘extracted’ at the 
Court’s initiative.12 Given the dissonance between this practice and the 
traditional costs rule, an exploration of these diverging opinions is warranted. 
This paper utilises both quantitative and qualitative research methods. It 
begins with a review of the sparse literature and judicial dicta on this topic. It 
then undertakes a quantitative assessment of the practice, reviewing all 
successful special leave applications from May 1998 to January 2017  
(the Gleeson and French Courts) to determine when and in what circum-
stances costs-conditional special leave is granted. The paper then considers 
broader questions about the practice, its justifications and appropriateness 
through a mixed methods framework. Qualitative interviews with a range of 
stakeholders provide varied perspectives on costs-conditional special leave, 
which are analysed and synthesised with the support of the data set. The paper 
concludes by considering the wider impact of this practice. 
Beyond the intellectual and policy relevance of the following discussion, it 
is hoped that this research may also have practical utility. While costs under-
takings are now widely understood to be the ‘price’ of special leave in 
appropriate cases,13 and there was unanimity among research participants that 
appellants never refuse the costs-conditions lest special leave be declined, 
from time to time it has been an issue in dispute. In May 2017, the question 
was squarely raised during a special leave hearing.14 Counsel for the appellant 
resisted funding the respondent’s appeal because they were ‘a well-heeled 
union’.15 Kiefel CJ held: ‘On condition that the applicant does not seek an 
 
 7 (1998) 193 CLR 72, 88–9 [40]–[45] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ), 109–10 [98]–[101] 
(McHugh J) (‘Oshlack’). 
 8 Kirby (n 5) 747. 
 9 Oshlack (n 7) 109 [98] (McHugh J).  
 10 Ibid 124 [137] (Kirby J). 
 11 Transcript of Proceedings, CSR Ltd v Thompson [2004] HCATrans 544, 99–101  
(Callinan J). 
 12 Ibid 103 (DF Jackson QC). 
 13 Transcript of Proceedings, Probuild Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Shade Systems Pty Ltd 
[2017] HCATrans 112, 369–74 (Gageler J) (‘Probuild Constructions (transcript)’). 
 14 Transcript of Proceedings, Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construc-
tion, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2017] HCATrans 106. 
 15 Ibid 654 (TM Howe QC). 
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order for costs of the appeal, there will be a grant of special leave. The Court is 
not minded to take the question of indemnification further.’16 In several other 
cases, disagreement between the parties has seen the question of costs 
deferred for determination at the appeal.17 Given the absence of rules or prior 
reasons controlling the Court’s discretion in such matters, guidance as to why 
and in what circumstances costs-conditions will be required may assist 
litigants. 
II   L I T E R AT U R E  A N D  J U DI C IA L  DIC TA:  A  (LI M I T E D)  RE V I E W 
The practice of costs-conditional special leave has origins in the Privy 
Council.18 Writing in 1912, Norman Bentwich explained: ‘Occasionally it has 
been made a term [of special leave to appeal] that the petitioner shall in any 
event pay the costs of both sides.’19 Bentwich cited an 1850 case involving the 
East India Company where leave was granted, notwithstanding the small sum 
in dispute, because the appellants undertook to pay ‘all costs, charges, and 
expenses of the respondent’.20 The comments of Lord Langdale in that case are 
instructive: 
The question is, whether this prosecution being by the East India Company, 
and no doubt important to have decided, for the benefit of the whole country, 
the whole expense of this appeal should not be borne by them. However im-
portant it may be to establish the law, upon a question of this kind, it would be 
very wrong to put the party to so great expense in a case where so small 
amount is at issue. Even if the right of appeal were granted, you might be  
 
 
 16 Ibid 701–3. 
 17 Transcript of Proceedings, CSR Ltd v Thompson [2004] HCATrans 544; Transcript of 
Proceedings, Air Link Pty Ltd v Paterson [2004] HCATrans 394; Transcript of Proceedings, 
Sons of Gwalia v Margaretic [2006] HCATrans 321. 
 18 Frank Safford and George Wheeler, The Practice of the Privy Council in Judicial Matters 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 1901) 762. The authors offer: ‘In granting special leave to appeal, the 
Judicial Committee will put the petitioner upon such terms as the circumstances of the case 
require’. Safford and Wheeler cite a number of cases where costs conditions were imposed, 
including several originating from Australia: see, eg, Graham v Berry (1865) 3 Moo PC NS 
207, 227; 16 ER 78, 85–6 (Lord Chelmsford) (‘Graham’); Shenton v Smith [1895] AC 229, 236 
(Lord Hobhouse); Main v Stark [1890] 15 App Cas 384, 390 (Earl of Selborne). 
 19 Norman Bentwich, The Practice of the Privy Council in Judicial Matters (Sweet & Maxwell, 
1912) 234. 
 20 Ibid 237, citing Spooner v Juddow (1850) 4 Moo Ind App 353, 361; 18 ER 734, 737 (Lord 
Langdale) (‘Spooner’). 
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defeated in this way; the Respondent may say, that it would be much better  
to pay his 250 rupees, than to come here, and pay the expense of this  
prosecution.21 
More than a century later, the Judiciary Amendment Act (No 2) 1984 (Cth) 
removed the last remaining appeals as of right to the High Court and estab-
lished a regime whereby appeals could not be brought unless special leave was 
granted.22 The question of costs was not adverted to by the legislation’s 
Explanatory Memorandum.23 However, following the Australian implementa-
tion of special leave, the Privy Council’s historical practice was adopted.24 In 
one work, the author cites cases from the mid-1980s where costs-conditional 
special leave was granted.25 
The High Court’s power to require costs undertakings stems from the 
discretionary nature of special leave.26 Section 35A of the Judiciary Act 1903 
(Cth) (‘Judiciary Act’) provides that the Court ‘may have regard to any matters 
that it considers relevant’ in determining whether to grant special leave.27 It 
then identifies several factors which the Court shall have regard to, including 
‘whether the interests of the administration of justice, either generally or in 
the particular case, require consideration [of the appeal] by the High Court’.28 
Accordingly, the question of costs is a factor reasonably within the Court’s 
purview when determining special leave, allowing it to require costs condi-
tions as it sees fit. While a corollary issue might arise as to whether imposing 
 
 21 Spooner (n 20) 737 (Lord Langdale). While it is unclear whether Spooner represents the first 
example of costs-conditional special leave, it became the preferred precedent to cite in later 
cases: see, eg, Graham (n 18) 86 (Lord Chelmsford). 
 22 Judiciary Amendment Act (No 2) 1984 (Cth) ss 3–4; Explanatory Memorandum, Judiciary 
Amendment Bill 1984 (Cth) ss 2–3. Before its removal, Parliament had gradually restricted 
the right of appeal to the High Court. In 1976, amendments to the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) 
circumscribed this right through the imposition of minimum damages: Judiciary Amendment 
Act 1976 (Cth) s 6(1). It was not until 1984, though, that the right was removed altogether 
and replaced by the special leave mechanism. 
 23 Explanatory Memorandum, Judiciary Amendment Bill 1984 (Cth). 
 24 Interview with David Jackson (Kieran Pender, Sydney, 31 April 2017). 
 25 David O’Brien, Special Leave to Appeal: The Law and Practice of Applications for Special Leave 
to Appeal to the High Court of Australia (LBC Information Services, 1996) 173  
n 258 (‘Special Leave to Appeal’). 
 26 Dean Mildren, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Courts in Australia (Federation Press, 2015) 
173. In Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Australia) Ltd v Commonwealth (1991) 173 CLR 
194 (‘Smith Kline’), the Court observed: ‘[Special leave] involves the exercise of a very wide 
discretion’: at 218 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).  
 27 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) (‘Judiciary Act’) s 35 (emphasis added). 
 28 Ibid. 
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costs conditions — and the manner in which the Court does so — are 
consistent with the exercise of judicial power, such questions will not be 
considered by this paper.29 
Little has been written, by judges or commentators, about costs-
conditional special leave in the High Court. David O’Brien highlighted the 
practice in his 1996 contribution, noting that ‘[s]pecial leave is sometimes 
granted upon conditions’ before citing a host of cases to support his short 
additional commentary.30 In a 2007 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal article, Justice Michael Kirby offered passing observations: ‘In some 
(rare) cases where an applicant represents a large group interest, it might offer 
to pay the respondent’s costs … and not to disturb costs below, as a sweetener 
to signify the importance of the case.’31 He continued:  
Similarly, if the Court voices concern that any grant of leave should be subject 
to [costs] requirements … such conditions should ordinarily be accepted as  
the price of having a test case of importance to the applicant heard, without  
burdening other parties swept along in expensive litigation.32  
Costs authority GE Dal Pont has also made brief comments on the topic, 
noting that the High Court pursues this course of action in cases where ‘the 
resolution of a point is desirable from the point of view of a large and recur-
rent litigant … but the opponent … is not well positioned to meet adverse 
costs orders’.33 While several other commentators have made similarly cursory 
observations, no scholar has considered costs-conditional special leave in  
any depth. 
Nor has there been much judicial introspection. The practice first received 
a degree of scrutiny in 1998 in Oshlack, when the High Court split over 
whether special leave conditions could be used to justify a departure from the 
traditional costs rule in another context.34 Oshlack was not a costs-conditional 
case — it involved an appellant seeking costs protections — but both the 
 
 29 For another critique of the constitutionality of the High Court’s current special leave 
mechanism, see Luke Beck, ‘The Constitutional Duty to Give Reasons for Judicial Decisions’ 
(2017) 40(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 923. 
 30 O’Brien, Special Leave to Appeal 1996 (n 25) 172–4. See also David O’Brien, Special Leave to 
Appeal (Supreme Court of Queensland Library, 2nd ed, 2007) 216. 
 31 Kirby (n 5) 747. 
 32 Ibid 750. 
 33 GE Dal Pont, ‘Costs’ in Graeme Blank and Hugh Selby (eds), Appellate Practice  
(Federation Press, 2008) 197, 198. 
 34 Oshlack (n 7). 
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majority and the minority analogised with the practice of granting costs-
conditional special leave. Gaudron and Gummow JJ pointed to conditional 
special leave — ‘[a]s the practice in this court testifies’ — to support the view 
that ‘[t]here is no absolute rule … a successful party is to be compensated by 
the unsuccessful party. Nor is there any rule that there is no jurisdiction to 
order a successful party to bear the costs of the unsuccessful party’.35 Kirby J 
concurred, drawing similarities with ‘the special orders which this Court quite 
frequently makes providing special leave to appeal upon [costs conditions]’ to 
identify ‘a discrete approach … where courts have concluded that a litigant 
has properly brought proceedings to advance a legitimate public interest’.36 
The plurality thereby developed a narrow exception to the traditional costs 
rule, and held that Al Oshlack was not required to pay costs, upholding 
judgment at first instance.37 
In dissent, McHugh J (with Brennan J agreeing) took issue with the costs-
conditional special leave analogy. ‘The offering or requiring of such an 
undertaking,’ his Honour wrote, ‘is far removed’ from a court failing to issue 
the usual costs order because of ‘some suggested public interest element 
associated with the litigation’.38 His Honour continued: 
The analogy suggested by [counsel] cannot be maintained. Indeed, if anything 
the example of special costs orders in special leave applications tends to support 
the Council’s position. The practice of requiring the applicant to pay the costs 
of the appeal, irrespective of the outcome is to protect the respondent from the 
costs of further litigation by the applicant. In this case, [counsel’s] argument 
seeks to protect the applicant from the costs that it has brought on the  
respondent.39 
McHugh J re-enlivened this debate several years later in CSR Ltd v Eddy  
(‘CSR v Eddy’), an asbestos case.40 During the special leave hearing, the 
respondent sought costs undertakings in reliance on a similar case where such 
 
 35 Ibid 88–9 [40]–[42]. 
 36 Ibid 124 [136]–[137]. 
 37 Ibid 91 [49]–[50] (Gaudron and Gummow JJ), 120 [133] (Kirby J). For the judgment at first 
instance, see Oshlack v Richmond River Shire Council (1994) 82 LGERA 236. See generally 
Kellie Edwards, ‘Costs and Public Interest Litigation after Oshlack v Richmond River Council’ 
(1999) 21(4) Sydney Law Review 680. 
 38 Oshlack (n 7) 109 [100]. 
 39 Ibid 109–10 [100] (emphasis in original). 
 40 CSR v Eddy (n 6). 
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conditions had been imposed.41 This led to disagreement among the bench: 
Kirby J suggested that if leave was being granted ‘to resolve a difference 
between jurisdictions of Australia’ then the condition would be ‘very prop-
er’,42 while Callinan J expressed reluctance: ‘So the first one who challenges it 
has to pay the costs[?]’ his Honour asked rhetorically.43 Ultimately, the 
question of costs was reserved for the Full Court to decide following the 
appeal. 
That ensuing judgment offers the most lucid clarification of the practice. 
While CSR Ltd were successful, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ 
awarded costs against them and ordered that costs below remain undisturbed. 
They wrote: ‘The appellants … prosecuted the appeals, in order to vindicate 
their long-term commercial interests … In contrast, the plaintiff had no 
interest in the legal position beyond this particular litigation.’44 The plurality 
continued: 
It is common in this Court in cases where the resolution of a point is desirable 
from the point of view of a large and recurrent litigant, whether corporate (for 
example, an insurance company) or government (for example, the Commis-
sioner of Taxation or the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission), 
but the other party to the litigation is not a recurrent litigant and is not well-
positioned to meet adverse costs orders on the point being tested, for the grant 
of special leave to be made [on a costs-conditional basis].45 
In separate dissents, McHugh J and Callinan J awarded costs to the appellant. 
McHugh J sought to distinguish requiring costs conditions for special leave 
and imposing them ex post facto, despite the issue being deferred in the 
special leave hearing: ‘[A] different area is reached when special leave has 
been granted without such a condition and the insurer succeeds in the  
appeal … I can see no principled justification for requiring [the appellant] to 
pay both parties’ costs in this Court.’46 Callinan J argued similarly.47 Oshlack 
and CSR v Eddy are the only two substantive judgments where the topic of 
 
 41 Transcript of Proceedings, CSR Ltd v Thompson [2004] HCATrans 544, 85–92. The case 
nomenclature changed following the death of the respondent, prior to the hearing of the 
appeal. 
 42 Ibid 142–7. 
 43 Ibid 165. 
 44 CSR v Eddy (n 6) 35 [80]–[81]. 
 45 Ibid 35 [81]. 
 46 Ibid 48 [118]–[119]. 
 47 Ibid 49–50 [122]–[127]. 
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costs-conditional special leave has been considered to any extent. As the 
disagreement in both cases indicates, neither propounded a comprehensive 
rationale for the practice. Further examination is therefore necessary.  
The obvious starting point for that analysis is the strands of reasoning 
offered by different judges in the various hearings and judgments discussed 
above. In its early jurisprudence on this topic, the Privy Council relied on 
fairness considerations in imposing costs-conditional special leave: ‘[I]t would 
be very wrong to put the party to so great expense in a case where so small 
amount is at issue.’48 Practicality was also relevant — the respondent might 
have simply settled if costs protections were not given. Similar issues have 
been posited by the High Court, with the nature of the parties and their 
interest in the litigation informing the practice. The Court has also under-
scored that questions of special leave and costs are both discretionary, giving 
the bench considerable flexibility.49  
Finally, the practice is not unique in Australia to the High Court, and at 
minimum seems to have been adopted by the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal. In New South Wales v Corby, for example, Basten JA imposed costs 
conditions when granting leave to appeal.50 His Honour identified several 
relevant factors, including that the legal uncertainty was due to unclear 
legislative drafting and because ‘there are other cases which will turn on the 
outcome of this case, in each of which the State is the respondent or defend-
ant’.51 While this paper will not consider the position in courts other than the 
High Court, that costs-conditional leave is not distinct to Australia’s apex 
judiciary emphasises the relevance of this research. 
III   Q UA N T I TAT I V E  A NA LYS I S  
To establish the frequency and nature of the High Court’s costs-conditional 
special leave practice, this paper will undertake a quantitative analysis. This is 
achieved through a review of all special leave transcripts available on the 
Australasian Legal Information Institute’s website (‘AustLII’) from the 
 
 48 Spooner (n 20) 737 (Lord Langdale). 
 49 See, eg, Smith Kline (n 26) 218 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and 
McHugh JJ). 
 50 (2010) 76 NSWLR 439, 441 [9] (‘Corby’). There is an interesting coincidence here: John 
Basten QC appeared as counsel for the respondent in Oshlack, and in argument made the 
connection between a public interest costs exception and costs-conditional special leave that 
drew McHugh J’s ire in the ultimate judgment: Oshalck (n 7) 109–10 [100]. 
 51 Corby (n 50) 441 [9]. 
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elevation of Chief Justice Gleeson in May 1998 until the departure of Chief 
Justice French in January 2017. The chosen time period adequately balances 
methodological soundness with practicality — it is sufficiently lengthy so as to 
constitute a valid sample size, yet remains within the timeframe for which 
special leave transcripts are readily available online. The elevation of Chief 
Justice Gleeson and the retirement of Chief Justice French offer helpful 
markers to delineate the study, although it is not this paper’s intention to 
scrutinise variation between each Court. An appendix listing all cases within 
the data set is available following the conclusion.52 
Empirical research of judicial processes is fraught with limitations, and 
researchers should be transparent about potential shortcomings.53 The data 
set relied upon here is imperfect — AustLII does not profess to be exhaustive, 
rather admitting that ‘[t]his database contains selected transcripts of the High 
Court of Australia’.54 In recent years, the Court has moved towards determin-
ing the majority of special leave applications ‘on the papers’,55 such that the 
data for the French Court may be incomplete.56 Finally, it is possible that the 
costs issue may not always be articulated during special leave hearings — 
where the appellant volunteers the condition, for example, it may be agreed 
between the parties prior to oral argument.57 Yet these limitations are not fatal 
to the utility of the present exercise. As early pioneers of quantitative legal 
research noted, the resulting statistics ‘are not an end in themselves but are 
intended to present a foundation for more detailed consideration’.58 Given the 
 
 52 See below Part VIII. 
 53 Andrew Lynch, ‘The Gleeson Court on Constitutional Law: An Empirical Analysis of its First 
Five Years’ (2003) 26(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 32, 35–6;  
Andrew Lynch and George Williams, ‘The High Court on Constitutional Law: The 2012 
Statistics’ (2013) 36(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 514, 514–15. 
 54 High Court of Australia Transcripts, AustLII (Web Page) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/ 
other/HCATrans/> (emphasis added). 
 55 Michael Pelly, ‘High Court Decides Leave Applications on Paper’, The Australian (online, 22 
July 2016) <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/high-court-decides-
leave-applications-on-paper/newsstory/016ccc6667e4f2b9ab52114d0715618d>. 
 56 The implications of this change are discussed below. 
 57 In a 2007–08 insurance case, for example, there was no discussion of costs during the special 
leave hearing: Transcript of Proceedings, CGU Insurance Ltd v Porthouse [2007] HCATrans 
599. However, in the ultimate judgment, the majority noted: ‘In accordance with an under-
taking given by the appellant on the application for a grant of special leave to appeal, the 
appellant should pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal to this Court’: CGU Insurance Ltd v 
Porthouse (2008) 235 CLR 103, 123 [77] (Gummow, Kirby, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) 
(‘Porthouse’). 
 58 Note, ‘The Supreme Court, 1948 Term’ (1949) 63(1) Harvard Law Review 119, 119. 
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absence of any detailed research into or data concerning the phenomena 
under study — including in the High Court’s annual reports, which do not 
discuss costs or costs-conditional grants of special leave — this quantitative 
analysis is a necessary and important starting point. 
A  Frequency 
How often does the High Court require costs-conditional special leave? Figure 
1 presents the frequency of the condition from May 1998 until January 2017. 
Special leave applications are included within this data set where one or both 
of the costs conditions — the appellant paying the respondent’s costs in any 
event and/or the appellant undertaking not to disturb costs orders below 
favourable to the respondent — were articulated during special leave. Applica-
tions are also included where the circumstances of the case gave rise to a 
suspicion that the condition might have been attached despite not being 
apparent in the transcript and a condition’s existence was confirmed by 
reference to the ultimate judgment.59  
Figure 1: Frequency of Costs-Conditional Special Leave 
 
Figure 1 indicates that, despite some year-on-year variation, the practice has 
remained consistent over the past two decades. Between May 1998 and 
January 2017, 121 special leave applications were granted on a costs-
conditional basis. On average, the condition(s) were required in 6.37 applica-
 
 59 See, eg, Porthouse (n 57). 
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tions per year. In the same period, the Court heard an average of 60.94 
appeals per year, such that costs conditions were prevalent in approximately 
10% of cases. As the Gleeson Court experienced a higher appellate workload, 
its individual average was approximately 8.5% of cases compared with 13.85% 
for the French Court.60 Thus, while there has been a slight increase in the 
frequency of costs-conditional special leave over the past two decades, it is not 
considerable. That the condition is required in approximately 10% of special 
leave cases indicates, although the practice does not occur ‘quite frequently’,61 
it is hardly ‘rare’ either.62  
B  Nature of Parties 
What type of party is most likely to be faced with costs-conditional special 
leave, and in what circumstances? Table 1 and Figure 2 indicate that the 
condition(s) arise most frequently when an appellant public authority is 
against an individual litigant respondent. The Minister for Immigration and 
Border Protection (and predecessors) is the party most commonly faced with 
the condition(s), being the appellant in almost a quarter of such cases over the 
Gleeson and French Courts. Costs-conditional special leave is also regularly 
imposed on the Commissioner of Taxation (and related parties), Comcare and 
the States. Quasi-public authorities included within this category include the 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation,63 a public university,64 the Victorian 
Legal Services Board65 and the New South Wales Independent Commission 
against Corruption.66 Public authority against individual litigant cases 
constitute over two thirds of total costs-conditional special leave in the 
relevant period.  
 
 60 These particular averages are somewhat imperfect as the appellate data is available per 
financial year whereas the Court changed in September 2008. This imperfection is not  
significant. 
 61 Oshlack (n 7) 124 [137] (Kirby J). 
 62 Justice Kirby (n 5) 747. 
 63 Transcript of Proceedings, Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2005]  
HCATrans 1029. 
 64 Transcript of Proceedings, Griffith University v Tang [2004] HCATrans 103. 
 65 Transcript of Proceedings, Legal Services Board v Gillespie-Jones [2013] HCATrans 53. 
 66 Transcript of Proceedings, Independent Commission against Corruption v Cunneen [2014] 
HCATrans 296. 
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Table 1: Nature of Parties 
Identity of Parties Frequency Percentage (2dp) 
Public Authority (PA) v Individual (I) 83 68.60% 
Corporation (C) v Individual (I) 22 18.18% 
Public Authority (PA) v Corporation (C) 7 5.79% 
Individual (I) v Individual (I) 6 4.96% 
Corporation (C) v Corporation (C) 3 2.48% 
Total 121 100%
Figure 2: Nature of Parties 
The next most frequent category of dispute where costs-conditional special 
leave arises is between a corporation and an individual, amounting to almost 
20% of such cases. About half of these matters involved workers’ compensa-
tion claims.67 In seven cases involving a public authority appellant and 
corporate or quasi-corporate respondent, one or both of the conditions has 
 67 See, eg, Transcript of Proceedings, ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd v Goudappel [2013] 
HCATrans 250. 
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been required.68 Three involved the Commissioner of Taxation, while in 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd the under-
taking was extracted on the basis that the issue had ‘far more importance for 
[the Australian Broadcasting Corporation] than it has for [the respondent]’.69 
The condition(s) have also been required in six disputes between individu-
al litigants.70 All six were tort cases, suggesting that an insurer was standing 
behind the appellant. French CJ was explicit in King v Philcox: ‘I take it [that] 
it is an insurer who is, in effect, seeking a determination of wider  
importance … .’71 Finally, in three cases, the condition(s) have been required 
from a corporate or quasi-corporate appellant against a corporate  
respondent.72 In Maxwell v Highway Hauliers Pty Ltd, an insurer volunteered 
the conditions by seeking leave ‘on terms that we paid for the improvement of 
jurisprudence’.73 The relative infrequency of costs conditions in corporate 
litigation indicates that it will only be imposed where volunteered or in light 
of exceptional circumstances. 
 
 68 Transcript of Proceedings, Fair Work Ombudsman v Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd 
[2015] HCATrans 193 (‘Quest South Perth Holdings (transcript)’); Transcript of Proceedings, 
Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Building Systems Pty Ltd (in liq) [2015] HCATrans 82; 
Transcript of Proceedings, Commissioner of Taxation v MBI Properties Pty Ltd [2014] HCA-
Trans 76; Transcript of Proceedings, Commissioner of Taxation v Reliance Carpet Co Pty Ltd 
[2007] HCATrans 809; Transcript of Proceedings, Northern Territory v Arnhem Land Aborig-
inal Land Trust [2007] HCATrans 324 (‘Arnhem Land Aboriginal Land Trust (transcript)’); 
Transcript of Proceedings, Bankstown City Council v Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd [2004]  
HCATrans 491; Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (High 
Court of Australia, H18/1999, Gleeson CJ and Kirby J, 12 May 2000) (‘Lenah Game Meats  
(transcript)’). 
 69 Lenah Game Meats (transcript) (n 68) 472–3 (Gleeson CJ). 
 70 Transcript of Proceedings, Stewart v Ackland [2015] HCATrans 226; Transcript of Proceed-
ings, Allen v Chadwick [2015] HCATrans 154; Transcript of Proceedings,  
King v Philcox [2014] HCATrans 253 (‘King (transcript)’); Transcript of Proceedings, Daly v 
Thiering [2013] HCATrans 139; Transcript of Proceedings, Neindorf v Junkovic [2005] HCA-
Trans 430; Transcript of Proceedings, Derrick v Cheung (High Court of Australia, S195/1999, 
Gaudron and Callinan JJ, 16 June 2000). 
 71 King (transcript) (n 70) 397–8. 
 72 Transcript of Proceedings, Maxwell v Highway Hauliers Pty Ltd [2014] HCATrans 51  
(‘Maxwell (transcript)’); Transcript of Proceedings, Aussie Vic Plant Hire Pty Ltd v Esanda 
Finance Corporation Ltd [2007] HCATrans 606; Transcript of Proceedings,  
International Air Transport Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd [2007] HCATrans 159 
(‘Ansett Australia (transcript)’).  
 73 Maxwell (transcript) (n 72) 28–9 (BW Walker QC). 
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C  Nature of Dispute 
What type of disputes typically see special leave granted on a costs-
conditional basis? There is, of course, a degree of overlap between this 
question and the immediately preceding subsection. As Table 2 shows, 
immigration matters constitute approximately a quarter of costs-conditional 
special leave cases. Similarly, areas of law that often generate disputes between 
individuals and recurrent, institutional litigants (whether corporate or public) 
are well-represented: tort law, workers’ compensation law and taxation law 
cumulatively represent almost 40% of total cases. The condition(s) are also 
prevalent in cases likely to have wide-ranging legal impact across Australia, 
including constitutional law, administrative law and employment law.74 As 
Kirby J quipped in Santos, ‘if … [Santos and the Northern Territory] want to 
bring up a case as a test case … and it raises an important constitutional 
question, it is a bit hard to have an ordinary citizen on the receiving end of 
costs orders’.75 
 74 For cases on constitutional law, see, eg, Transcript of Proceedings, A-G (NT) v Emmerson 
[2013] HCATrans 244; Transcript of Proceedings, New South Wales v Kable [2012] HCATrans 
356; Transcript of Proceedings, A-G (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2012] HCA-
Trans 107 (‘City of Adelaide (transcript)’); Transcript of Proceedings, Santos Ltd v Chaffey 
[2007] HCATrans 49 (‘Santos (transcript)’); Transcript of Proceedings, A-G (Cth) v Breckler 
(High Court of Australia, P10/1998, Gummow and Hayne JJ, 19 June 1998)  
(‘Breckler (transcript)’). For cases on administrative law, see, eg, Transcript of Proceedings, 
Commonwealth v Kutlu [2012] HCATrans 35 (‘Kutlu (transcript)’); Transcript of Proceedings, 
Griffith University v Tang [2004] HCATrans 103; Transcript of Proceedings, Shergold v Tanner 
(High Court of Australia, M128/2000, Gummow and Kirby JJ, 22 June 2001). For cases on 
employment law, see, eg, Transcript of Proceedings, Commonwealth Bank of Australia v 
Barker [2013] HCATrans 325; Transcript of Proceedings, Commissioner of Police v Eaton 
[2012] HCATrans 189; Quest South Perth Holdings (transcript) (n 68). 
 75 Santos (transcript) (n 74) 135–8. 
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Table 2: Nature of Dispute 
Dispute Subject Matter Frequency Percentage (2dp) 
Immigration Law 30 24.79% 
Tort Law 21 17.36% 
Taxation Law 13 10.74% 
Workers’ Compensation Law 13 10.74% 
Criminal Law 8 6.61% 
Corporate Law 6 4.96% 
Constitutional Law 5 4.13% 
Statutory Interpretation Law 5 4.13% 
Administrative Law 3 2.48% 
Conflict of Laws 3 2.48% 
Employment Law 3 2.48% 
Other 11 9.09%
Total 121 100% 
An interesting appearance in Table 2 is criminal law. In the period under 
consideration (1998–2017), costs-conditional special leave was not imposed 
in a criminal matter until 2007.76 In the 2009 case of R v LK, exchanges 
between the bench and counsel led to the conclusion that ‘it has not been a 
practice to make costs conditional in criminal cases’ and the question of costs 
 76 Excluding an environmental law test case involving criminal penalties: Transcript  
of Proceedings, Morrison v Peacock (High Court of Australia, S274/2000,  
Gleeson CJ and McHugh J, 10 August 2001); and an exceptional case considering criminal 
penalties under fishing regulations where a government department had induced the com-
mission of the crime: Ostrowski v Palmer (High Court of Australia, P25/2002, McHugh and 
Heydon JJ, 9 May 2003). See also Warwick Gullett, ‘Relying on Fishy Advice: The Ostrowski 
Decision’ (2004) 21(4) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 245. The conditions were 
first required in a criminal forfeiture case: Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (Vic) v Le [2007] 
HCATrans 250. 
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was deferred for determination with the appeal.77 Yet costs conditions have 
been present in numerous state-as-appellant criminal matters in subsequent 
years,78 suggesting that the rationale and application of the practice is amena-
ble to development. However, as the respondent in R v Dookheea discovered, 
such change in the criminal context is incomplete — counsel for  
Mr Dookheea unsuccessfully sought the condition in 2016.79 
D  Nature of Conditions 
Lastly, what is the nature of the conditions imposed? The High Court has 
distinguished between two limbs of costs-conditional special leave: the 
appellant paying the respondent’s appeal costs (the first limb), and the 
appellant undertaking not to disturb costs below (the second limb). How 
often are these required together, and how often is only one condition 
imposed? Table 3 indicates that, in the vast majority of cases, both conditions 
are volunteered or required. In nearly 16% of cases, only the first limb is 
imposed. In terms of party identity, this subset is broadly representative: 68% 
of ‘first limb only’ cases involve a public authority against an individual, which 
is identical to the overall ratio of such cases as a percentage of all costs-
conditional cases. However, criminal and constitutional cases are overrepre-
sented: 21.05% of ‘first limb only’ matters are criminal compared with 6.61% 
in the total data set, while 15.79% are constitutional compared with 4.13% 
overall. In the former, this is likely because costs are not typically awarded in 
criminal cases, such that there will not ordinarily be costs orders below at risk 
of disturbance.80 
Even where the second limb is not required to gain special leave, the impo-
sition of the first may later weigh against an order to disturb costs below. As 
much was the case in Maurice Blackburn Cashman v Brown (‘Maurice 
Blackburn’), where the High Court rejected the successful appellant’s applica-
 
 77 Transcript of Proceedings, R v LK [2009] HCATrans 146, 677–8 (TA Game SC). On the first 
day of the appeal, the appellant volunteered to pay the respondent’s costs but not the costs of 
the respondent’s notice of contention: R v LK (2010) 241 CLR 177, 213 [79] (French CJ). 
 78 See, eg, Transcript of Proceedings, DPP (Vic) v Dalgliesh [2016] HCATrans 312; Police v 
Dunstall [2015] HCATrans 63; R v Khazaal [2011] HCATrans 279 (‘Khazaal (transcript)’). 
 79 Transcript of Proceedings, R v Dookheea [2016] HCATrans 284, 455–65  
(OP Holdenson QC, French CJ). 
 80 See, eg, Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534, 561 (Dawson J); R v Mosely (1992) 28 NSWLR 
735, 738 (Gleeson CJ). 
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tion for its Court of Appeal costs.81 The Court held: ‘This being a test case on a 
point of general application and the [first limb] undertaking having been 
given, the orders for costs made by the Court of Appeal in favour of the 
plaintiff should not be disturbed.’82 Finally, there are also a small number of 
cases where the transcript and ultimate judgment are ambiguous as to one 
limb but not the other. 
Table 3: Nature of Conditions 
Conditions Frequency Percentage (2dp) 
Both Limbs Imposed 91 75.21% 
Only First Limb Imposed 19 15.70% 
First Limb Imposed; 
Ambiguity Regarding Second Limb 
9 7.44% 
Ambiguity Regarding First Limb; 
Second Limb Imposed 
1 0.83% 
Conditions Imposed, but 
Ambiguity Regarding Both Limbs 
1 0.83% 
Total 121 100% 
 
IV  CO N S I DE R AT I O N 
This paper will now consider broader issues surrounding the practice, 
including its rationale and appropriateness. It does this through a mixed 
methods framework, combining elite stakeholder qualitative interviews with 
analysis of the above data set. 
A  Qualitative Methodology 
Given the lack of academic or curial writing on this topic, qualitative inter-
views provide an opportunity to explore costs-conditional special leave with 
key stakeholders. During this research, the author interviewed six individuals: 
 
 81 (2011) 242 CLR 647, 663 [43] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ)  
(‘Maurice Blackburn’). 
 82 Ibid. 
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Justice Stephen Gageler (sitting High Court justice); Justin Gleeson SC 
(former Solicitor-General of Australia, currently a practising barrister); Tom 
Howe QC (Chief Counsel Dispute Resolution, Australian Government 
Solicitor);83 The Hon Michael Kirby AC CMG (former High Court Justice); 
David Jackson QC (practising barrister); and Ben Wickham (Deputy Regis-
trar, High Court). While the author did not seek a representative sample, 
participant selection was purposive to achieve a sufficiently diverse sample. 
The participants cumulatively provide judicial, governmental and com-
mercial perspectives — indeed, in some cases the same participant was able to 
offer more than one viewpoint in light of their mixed professional back-
ground. Justice Gageler frequently appeared before the High Court as a 
barrister and then Solicitor-General of Australia, and his elevation to the 
bench enables him to provide a contemporary judicial perspective on the 
topic. Gleeson SC likewise offers mixed governmental and commercial 
insight. Howe QC is heavily involved in the Commonwealth’s High Court 
litigation, and is one of the few counsel to engage with the bench on the 
question of costs conditions on multiple occasions. Kirby also frequently 
commented on the topic during his time on the Court, and was on the bench 
for much of the period under study. Jackson QC is one of the most experi-
enced appellate counsel in Australia, thus offering an informed and longer-
term perspective. Finally, Wickham was able to provide an institutional 
viewpoint. 
The interviews were conducted in person or, in one case, via telephone, in 
Canberra and Sydney. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and an hour. A 
semi-structured interview methodology was adopted, with funnel questioning 
allowing the participant’s uninfluenced perspective to be elicited before 
specific propositions were put to them. Participants were forthcoming in their 
responses, and while legal professional privilege inhibited complete disclosure 
of case-specific details, all participants were prepared to speak at a level of 
generality. Consistent with the ethics protocol for this research, each partici-
pant was given an opportunity to review their extracted quotations prior to 
publication. The primary limitation of the sample was size — absent time and 
financial restrictions, an increased number of participants may have provided 
a greater variety of responses. Future research may also wish to consider 
perspectives from litigants themselves — public authorities or corporate 
parties could shed light on the appellant approach to these conditions, while 
 
 83 Mr Howe’s views were expressed in a personal capacity, and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the Australian Government Solicitor or the Attorney General’s Department. 
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individual respondents may offer interesting insight into the impact of costs 
protections on their attitude towards the proceedings. 
B  Why? 
Several factors appear to motivate the Court’s costs-conditional special leave 
practice. These can be delineated into three distinct, albeit interrelated 
themes: practical considerations, fairness and the nature of the High Court. It 
is important to reiterate, though, that these motivations are deciphered from 
expert perspective and brief commentary in special leave transcripts, rather 
than directly specified in judicial statements. As Howe QC recalled: ‘I do not 
think I have ever been in a case where the court has actually articulated in any 
precise way its rationale for attaching these conditions.’84 This observation 
was supported by Kirby, who commented: ‘[T]here were no detailed rules or 
protocols … essentially this was an ad hoc decision in each case … reasons 
were not given.’85 
1 Practical Considerations 
The imposition of costs conditions has practical benefits for the Court. Firstly, 
it promotes — in the words of Gleeson SC — ‘equality of arms’.86 Counsel for 
the respondent in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill identified the 
‘disparity of resources between the parties’ and implored the Court to ‘look 
very carefully at the need to have that imbalance redressed so as any point 
that is allowed to be raised on appeal can be properly argued, and properly 
resourced by the parties’.87 Costs conditions were imposed. A less pecunious 
respondent is thereby not disadvantaged by financial factors in choice of 
representation, ensuring (at least in theory) that the strongest arguments are 
put on their behalf. This has a ‘systemic benefit for the Court’, according to 
Justice Gageler, because it guarantees that ‘the question of law will be exam-
ined with the benefit of properly funded representation on both sides’.88 
This rationale has been explicated during special leave hearings on several 
occasions. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v White, 
McHugh J told counsel for the appellant: ‘[T]he Court would be assisted by 
 
 84 Interview with Tom Howe (Kieran Pender, Canberra, 13 April 2017). 
 85 Email from Michael Kirby to Kieran Pender, 2 May 2017. 
 86 Interview with Justin Gleeson (Kieran Pender, Sydney, 1 May 2017). 
 87 Transcript of Proceedings, Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill [2005]  
HCATrans 1029, 266–72 (PW Tree SC). 
 88 Interview with Justice Stephen Gageler (Kieran Pender, Canberra, 11 May 2017). 
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the best possible arguments … I have in mind senior counsel appearing, if 
possible, on behalf of the respondents.’89 In R v Tang, meanwhile, the Court 
advised the appellant of an expectation that their undertaking ‘would extend 
to senior counsel’.90 This factor was also recognised by some participants — 
Howe QC observed that, absent the conditions, ‘there would be a lot more 
appeals heard with junior counsel representing the litigant’.91 Accordingly, the 
conditions ensure that respondents without ample financial resources are 
adequately represented by the collective efforts of junior and senior counsel, 
to the Court’s ultimate benefit. 
Costs-conditional special leave also discourages respondents from settling. 
While settlement may be desirable elsewhere, in the present context it 
deprives the High Court of its law-developing function.92 Recall the com-
ments of Lord Langdale in an early Privy Council case imposing costs 
conditions: ‘Even if the right of appeal were granted, you might be defeated in 
this way; the Respondent may say, that it would be much better to pay his 250 
rupees, than to come here, and pay the expense of this prosecution.’93 
Protecting the respondent from adverse costs removes a considerable incen-
tive for settlement. 
Finally, costs conditions ensure the case includes an effective contradic-
tor.94 Even absent settlement, a respondent who does not wish to fully defend 
the appeal might leave the Court without opposing argument. This concern 
has been articulated in numerous special leave hearings.95 Most recently, in 
the 2015 case of Fair Work Ombudsman v Quest South Perth Holdings Pty Ltd, 
the Court required that the appellant  
undertake to pay [the respondent’s] costs as a party if they participate as a  
contradicting respondent and if they are not prepared to participate … you  
 
 89 Transcript of Proceedings, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v White (High 
Court of Australia, P30/2000, McHugh J and Kirby J, 5 September 2000) 414–17. 
 90 Transcript of Proceedings, R v Tang [2007] HCATrans 810, 496–7 (Kirby J). 
 91 Interview with Tom Howe (Kieran Pender, Canberra, 13 April 2017). 
 92 The persuasiveness of this view in the present context is not universally held:  
see CSR v Eddy (n 6) 50 [126] (Callinan J): ‘Settlements are encouraged by the courts in the 
public, as well as the parties’, interests. The purpose that they are intended to serve is not to 
be subverted in a particular case simply because one of the parties has miscalculated his 
prospects.’ 
 93 Spooner (n 20) 737. 
 94 Interview with Tom Howe (Kieran Pender, Canberra, 13 April 2017). 
 95 See, eg, Transcript of Proceedings, A-G (WA) v Marquet (High Court of Australia, 
P114/P115/2002, Gummow J, Callinan J and Heydon J, 11 April 2003) 87–92  
(SJ Gageler SC); City of Adelaide (transcript) (n 74) 272–6 (French CJ).  
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undertake to fund the costs of counsel to appear as an amicus curiae in lieu of a 
contradictor.96 
The quantitative data set from Part III provides ample support for the 
relevance of these practical considerations. An overwhelming 91.73% of costs-
conditional special leave cases involved a natural person respondent — the 
litigant type where financial factors are likely to be significant. Indeed the 
most common typology of dispute — public authority v individual (constitut-
ing approximately two thirds of the total) — is that where resource disparity 
will be most evident. The minimal number of corporate respondents (8.27%) 
and complete absence of public authorities receiving costs protections is 
similarly indicative of the importance of these practical considerations. 
2 Fairness 
Ensuring a degree of fairness between the parties has been expounded as an 
important reason for the practice of granting costs-conditional special leave. 
This has at least two elements. Firstly, where the appellant has a broader 
interest in the litigation than the respondent, it is not unreasonable for the 
appellant to foot the bill. The representative statement is found in CSR v Eddy: 
‘The appellants … prosecuted the appeals, in order to vindicate their long-
term commercial interests … In contrast, the plaintiff had no interest in the 
legal position beyond this particular litigation.’97 This is especially so given  
the respondent has already been through two levels of the judiciary — as  
Gleeson SC observed, they have a ‘legitimate expectation’ in the extant 
outcome.98 
Kirby and Howe QC both endorsed this view. The former offered that 
‘where a matter of public interest was urged on behalf of the applicant, the 
Court would not unnaturally take the view that its superior economic means 
should require that it indemnify the respondent’;99 similarly, the latter 
concurred:  
[W]hen the Commonwealth is there, it is nearly always referable to a wider 
concern about some aspect of public administration, and the Court therefore 
 
 96 Quest South Perth Holdings (transcript) (n 68) 65–8 (French CJ). 
 97 CSR v Eddy (n 6) 35 [80]–[81] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Heydon JJ). 
 98 Interview with Justin Gleeson (Kieran Pender, Sydney, 1 May 2017). 
 99 Email from Michael Kirby to Kieran Pender, 2 May 2017. 
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considers that it is inappropriate, in most such cases at least, for the individual 
litigant to be subjected to a costs risk.100  
Similar statements were made in numerous hearings.101 
The imbalanced financial position of the parties was also often invoked 
during special leave hearings as an aspect of the fairness consideration. In 
Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar, for example, counsel for the respondent sought 
‘that the grant be conditioned, having regard to the nature of the appeal by an 
insurer against a worker who is not in good circumstances’.102 In other cases, 
reference has been made in pursuit of costs protections to respondents being 
‘a 90-year-old woman with a very small shareholding’103 and ‘a lady who is 
permanently and totally incapacitated … [and where] [t]he amount of tax 
involved is $2,000’.104 Justice Gageler identified this rationale, highlighting the 
case of a ‘deep pocketed applicant’ against a respondent ‘not having the 
wherewithal to fund an examination in the interests of the legal system as a 
whole’ as typically giving rise to the costs conditions.105 
Part III’s quantitative data is consistent with the relevance of this fairness 
consideration. That 86.78% of costs-conditional special leave cases involved a 
corporate or public authority litigant against an individual strongly supports 
the conceptualisation of costs conditions as being applicable where one party 
has a broader interest in the litigation and the other does not. Data regarding 
the nature of the dispute is also harmonious with this factor. In these cases, 
63.64% involved either immigration law, tort law, taxation law or workers’ 
compensation law — all areas where an individual respondent’s interest is 
unlikely to extend beyond the case itself, but where the corporate or public 
authority appellant has a broader interest in the jurisprudential development. 
Immigration cases are an archetypal example — the relevant minister is 
concerned with the wider state of the law due to pending cognate cases and 
their ongoing responsibilities, while a migrant or refugee is only interested in 
the particular adverse decision they initially challenged. Such disputes were 
 
 100 Interview with Tom Howe (Kieran Pender, Canberra, 13 April 2017). 
 101 See, eg, King (transcript) (n 70) 396–400 (French CJ); Transcript of Proceedings,  
Ruddock v Taylor [2004] HCATrans 390, 4–10 (Kirby J) (‘Ruddock v Taylor (transcript)’). 
 102 Transcript of Proceedings, Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar [2010] HCATrans 339, 474–6  
(BM Toomey QC) (‘Dasreef (transcript)’). 
 103 Transcript of Proceedings, Commissioner of Taxation v McNeil [2006] HCATrans 39,  
256–7 (Kirby J). 
 104 Transcript of Proceedings, Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Scully (High Court of  
Australia, M58/1998, McHugh and Gummow J, 12 February 1999) (GJ Davies QC). 
 105 Interview with Justice Stephen Gageler (Kieran Pender, Canberra, 11 May 2017). 
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the most frequent in the data set, constituting almost one quarter of the total 
number of costs-conditional special leave cases. 
The typical imposition of both limbs of the costs conditions also demon-
strates the relevance of fairness considerations. If the High Court was only 
concerned about the practical factors discussed above, these would be largely 
ameliorated by requiring the appellant to pay the respondent’s appeal costs 
(the first limb). However, in 75.21% of cases, the appellant also agreed (or was 
required) not to disturb the costs orders below, which are typically favourable 
to the respondent. This second limb does not assist in improving quality of 
representation in the High Court, nor does it ensure the presence of an 
effective contradictor. While it may discourage settlement and prevent costs in 
one court being set off against costs in another, broadly speaking, the second 
limb ensures fairness to the respondent rather than addressing practical 
matters. 
Inevitably, this factor will involve a degree of value judgment from the 
bench (except where costs undertakings have been volunteered), to determine 
whether the mismatch of interests and resources is such that fairness consid-
erations require costs-conditional special leave. This point was starkly made 
by Kirby J in Ruddock v Taylor, where Solicitor-General David Bennett QC 
proffered an undertaking as to costs of the appeal (the first limb) but resisted 
imposition of the second limb (costs below).106 Bennett argued that ‘[t]he 
logic of the undertaking does not extend to the second limb’, to which Kirby J 
retorted: ‘Logic may not but the justice may.’107 
3 Nature of the High Court 
Finally, the unique nature of the High Court provides an additional justifica-
tion for costs-conditional special leave. This point is related to the question of 
fairness, albeit considered from an institutional perspective. Kirby explained: 
‘Do not make the mistake of thinking that the High Court is just another 
Court. The High Court is the end of the litigious line. It is a national court 
with national responsibilities to express and develop the law.’108 In light of this 
law-making role, ‘costs should not necessarily fall on the hapless party who 
has been brought into the Court by more powerful or monied interests’.109 
Ordinary litigants, Kirby continued, ‘generally have no particular interest in 
 
 106 Ruddock v Taylor (transcript) (n 101). 
 107 Ibid (DMJ Bennett QC, Kirby J). 
 108 Interview with Michael Kirby (Kieran Pender, Telephone Interview, 11 May 2017). 
 109 Ibid. 
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helping the community to clarify an area of the law’.110 Several participants 
identified this public interest associated with High Court cases, and it aligns 
with the statutory basis on which special leave applications are considered 
pursuant to s 35A of the Judiciary Act: ‘[W]hether the proceedings … involve 
a question of law … that is of public importance.’111 
Special leave, in turn, has a distinct nature that supports these considera-
tions. A party seeking special leave has ordinarily already had the benefit of a 
first instance judgment and an intermediate tier of review. The appellant is 
thus ‘asking for an exercise of extraordinary power to come to this court and 
have yet another appellate tier of review’.112 Justice Gageler therefore disagreed 
that costs conditions were discordant with traditional costs rules, because ‘we 
have moved to another stage. We are talking about a condition of this grant of 
what is called special leave for very good reason — it is special, it is different, 
it is not normal’.113 Such points have also been ventilated in special leave 
hearings.114  
While it is more difficult to discern the particular relevance of this factor 
in Part III’s data set, the nature of the disputes where costs conditions were 
imposed does provide some quantitative corroboration. Costs conditions were 
prevalent in areas of law likely to have an Australia-wide impact (such as 
immigration law, taxation law, corporate law, constitutional law, statutory 
interpretation law and employment law, cumulatively constituting 53.72% of 
cases in the data set) and those where state-level divergence is common (such 
as tort law and workers’ compensation law, cumulatively constituting 28.10% 
of cases). This aligns with another limb of s 35A of the Judiciary Act: 
‘[W]hether the proceedings … involve a question of law … in respect of 
which a decision of the High Court … is required to resolve differences of 
opinion between different courts.’115 Conversely, costs conditions were rarely 
imposed in areas of law that are more jurisdictionally-particular, such as 
environmental law, planning law and procedure (one case each). To be truly 
instructive, this data would need to be compared with the frequency of these 
case types in all appeals (not only those where costs-conditional special leave 
is granted); such analysis goes beyond the present paper’s scope.  
 
 110 Ibid.  
 111 Judiciary Act (n 27) s 35A. 
 112 Interview with Justice Stephen Gageler (Kieran Pender, Canberra, 11 May 2017). 
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 114 See, eg, Ruddock v Taylor (transcript) (n 101) 4–10 (Kirby J). 
 115 Judiciary Act (n 27) s 35A. 
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C  A Preliminary Assessment 
The appropriateness of each factor will now be briefly considered. While it is 
not the central purpose of this paper to cast definitive judgment on the 
appropriateness (or otherwise) of each factor, it is intended that this  
subsection will complement the underlying data and provide, in the words of 
Crennan J, ‘food for thought’.116 
1 Practical Considerations 
The relevance of practical considerations in imposing costs-conditional 
special leave is uncontroversial. While arguably these factors might support a 
more radical reform of costs (adequate representation is important at any 
stage of the litigious process), their relevance is heightened given the exalted 
nature of the particular judicial forum. Similar considerations motivated the 
federal government’s underwriting of representation in the dual citizenship 
constitutional litigation. Attorney-General George Brandis said at the time: 
‘It’s the customary and long established practice in cases like this that the 
Commonwealth pays … there’s a public interest in doing so.’117 Concerns 
regarding the presence of an effective contradictor were also raised during 
that litigation, in light of the parallel positions of many parties.118 
2 Fairness 
The financial element of the fairness factor raises several perplexing questions. 
The wealth of a party is not typically a pertinent factor in determining costs — 
otherwise government litigants would never recover against individual 
parties. Yet in the special leave context, a party’s financial capacity seems to 
become squarely relevant. This was starkly illustrated in Commissioner of 
Taxation v Qantas Airways Ltd.119 In the immediately preceding special leave 
hearing, the respondent had successfully sought costs conditions on the grant, 
despite the appellant’s objections.120 Qantas then requested costs conditions 
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‘on the very same grounds that were rehearsed in the immediately preceding 
application’,121 which led to the following illuminating exchange: 
Gummow J: They related to the personal circumstances of those litigants. Your 
client’s personal circumstances are rather different. 
Ms Batrouney: Yes and no, although the reason this was being granted is the 
matter of public importance and for those reasons, it does not seem right that 
Qantas should have to pay the costs. 
Gummow J: What do you say about that, Mr Slater?  
Mr Slater: Qantas is not quite in the same position as a struggling doctor who is 
facing bankruptcy, your Honour …122 
While at first glance it may seem absurd to suggest that Qantas, a multi-billion 
dollar company, requires costs protection, there is some force in Jennifer 
Batrouney QC’s (ultimately unsuccessful) submissions. If the basis for costs-
conditional special leave is the public interest in the case (and fairness 
considerations relating to the respondent’s disinterest beyond the resolution 
of the immediate dispute), then why shouldn’t Qantas receive costs protec-
tion? Gummow J’s comments highlight the relevance of the parties’ relative 
financial position in the decision-making process, raising questions as to 
whether that should be a legitimate consideration for the court. 
Conversely, in the ordinary costs context, courts have reiterated their in-
difference to a party’s financial position. In Scott v Secretary, Department of 
Social Security [No 2], Beaumont and French JJ observed: 
The appellants are litigants in person. They are impecunious. They rely on so-
cial security benefits. They are not able to satisfy any costs order made against 
them. However sympathetic one may personally be to arguments of this kind, 
inability to meet a costs order or the fact that the losing party has limited  
financial means has never been a sufficient reason to deny a successful party his  
costs …123 
Brereton J adopted the same approach in a more recent case, adding: ‘[T]hat 
an adverse costs order will occasion hardship, or even prove ruinous, to an 
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unsuccessful plaintiff is hardly if ever sufficient reason not to make the order: 
it is a risk that the plaintiff assumes in bringing proceedings.’124 It is difficult 
to reconcile these conflicting positions. Why should a ‘worker who is not in 
good circumstances’ receive costs protection,125 while an ‘impecunious’ 
litigant is afflicted with an adverse costs order?126 The only apparent distinc-
tion is that one won in the court below and the other did not — a problematic 
division discussed further below. 
A related point concerns the six cases in the data set where costs-
conditions were imposed on individual applicants in disputes against individ-
ual respondents. All six were tort cases, suggesting that an insurer was 
standing behind the applicant — something made explicit by the bench in 
King v Philcox.127 It is one thing for the Court to take an educated guess as to 
the financial status of a party directly involved in the proceedings, but 
arguably quite another for judicial notice to be taken of an insurer standing 
behind the applicant.128 With the rise of third-party litigation funding, this 
issue could gain greater importance. 
3 Nature of the High Court 
While the peculiar nature of the High Court is a compelling rationale, its 
persuasiveness is weakened somewhat by the observation that arguably all 
High Court appeals have a public interest element — indeed, it is a statutory 
criterion for a grant of special leave.129 The Court rarely, if ever, considers 
appeals that do not have some broader relevance to the state of the law in 
Australia, and it is often said that legal error is not alone a sufficient ground 
for special leave.130 It might therefore be reasonably asked: if the nature of the 
High Court and the cases it hears are a primary motivation for costs-
conditional special leave, why aren’t more appeals conditioned on that basis?  
Conversely, the central idea that the High Court’s broader law-developing 
role — and the correlative public interest going beyond the parties — is 
sufficiently distinct so as to warrant an alternative approach to costs is not 
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uncontroversial. As Heerey, Whitlam and North JJ put forcefully in a 1998 
case: 
In a common law jurisdiction decisions of the courts, in private as well as  
public law, often clarify the law or lay down new law for the benefit of citizens, 
taxpayers, traders, patentees, insurers and insureds, landlords and tenants, etc 
etc. To that extent, much litigation has a public interest going beyond the  
interests of the parties. But this feature is inherent in common law litigation 
and provides no ground for departure from the usual rule as to costs. And, as 
has been pointed out in another context, what interests the public is not  
necessarily in the public interest …131 
V  OT H E R  OB S E RVAT I O N S 
The research undertaken also illuminates a range of related issues deserving 
discussion. 
A  Extent of Costs 
Where the appellant is required to pay the respondent’s costs, that condition 
is typically made — albeit implicitly — on a party and party basis (‘all [costs] 
that are necessary to enable the adverse party to conduct the litigation, and no 
more’).132 This was previously a matter of uncertainty. In 1995, Jackson QC 
wrote to then Chief Justice Brennan as to ‘the intended basis of the  
condition — is it to provide for costs as on a party and party basis, or on a 
solicitor and client indemnity basis? There is no particular reason, in my view, 
why it should not be on the higher basis.’133 While Chief Justice Brennan 
promised to refer the correspondence to the Rules Committee,134  
Jackson QC’s suggestion was not ultimately adopted. In 1998, counsel for the 
respondent in the proceedings of Attorney-General (Cth) v Breckler sought 
indemnity costs on the basis that his clients ‘find themselves having to argue a  
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matter which, in a number of respects, is academic’.135 The Acting Solicitor-
General contended that the condition ‘should be party/party costs in the 
normal course’,136 and the Court agreed that such costs would be ‘sufficient’.137 
Almost a decade later, counsel for the respondent in New South Wales v 
Ibbett sought indemnity costs on the basis of the respondent’s infirmity and 
the appellant’s prior conduct.138 Kirby J found no reason to depart from the 
typical practice: ‘I have been sitting here for 10 years and I do not think I can 
remember a full indemnity basis.’139 The extent of the costs condition has also 
been described as requiring payment of ‘[r]easonable costs’,140 although there 
is likely no distinction. While the imposition of party and party costs  
now appears standard, the concluding comments of Jackson QC in his  
correspondence with Chief Justice Brennan still ring true. ‘The result of 
adopting a party and party basis,’ he wrote, ‘is really that the lawyers end up 
bearing the difference’.141 
B  Limitations 
On the other hand, the Court has resisted attempts to further discount or 
otherwise restrict the costs conditions. In Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship v Kumar, the appellant argued that, to achieve a ‘level playing 
field’,142 the condition should be limited to ‘Commonwealth rates’.143 The 
Court was unconvinced: ‘I think we might dispense with that particular 
limitation’, determined French CJ.144 A question has arisen on several occa-
sions as to the scope of an appellant’s obligation to fund the respondent’s 
appeal. In Minister for Home Affairs v Zentai, an extradition case, the appellant 
volunteered the conditions but expressed reservations about funding the 
entirety of the respondent’s case: ‘We understand that they may wish to raise a 
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notice of contention and we say we should not be put to guarantee them to 
pay them for anything raised in a notice of contention.’145 After an assurance 
from the respondent that any such notice would be limited, French CJ simply 
held that ‘the appellant will meet the respondents’ costs on the appeal’.146 
Only two months earlier, the Director of Public Prosecutions had attempt-
ed the same strategy without success. In R v Khazaal, the appellant volun-
teered both limbs of the condition but ‘limited to the costs of the grounds 
raised by the Applicant’.147 This was insufficient for Gummow J, who granted 
special leave on costs conditions ‘on terms that that undertaking not have the 
final limitation as to the grounds raised by the appellant, but [that] it would 
include the notice of contention if that were to be forthcoming’.148 This 
approach is consistent with the motivations for the costs-conditional  
practice — it would hardly assist the Court if one party was forced to argue 
with a hand tied behind its back. 
C  Inconsistency and Timing 
While special leave transcripts indicate that the imposition of costs conditions 
is occasionally at the Court’s initiative,149 that practice appears to be more ad 
hoc than systematic in the absence of conditions being volunteered or sought. 
The cases of Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (‘Jia’) and 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v White (‘White’) are 
instructive.150 The substantive hearings for each were held together and a 
single judgment issued. Yet despite considerable similarity in factual matrixes 
and legal issues, special leave was granted on a costs conditional basis in the 
latter but not the former.151 Hence, although the appellant was successful in 
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both, Mr Jia faced an adverse costs order but Mr White did not.152 There may 
of course have been good reason for this disparity not immediately evident in 
the transcript or judgment, and it may have been that the Minister did not 
enforce the costs order against Mr Jia. Regardless, Jia and White provide an 
apt reminder for respondent counsel that it is they who should be seeking 
costs conditions on special leave where appropriate. 
A related point is that costs undertakings must be sought at the time of 
special leave — forgetful counsel cannot seek to remedy their error during the 
appeal. This issue was directly addressed by the High Court in the 1986 case 
of J Robins (Chippendale) Pty Ltd v Sakic (‘Sakic’), where the respondent 
sought favourable costs orders prior to the hearing of the substantive ap-
peal.153 Despite the plurality noting that ‘an order such as was belatedly 
sought by the respondent may well have been made as a condition of the grant 
of special leave’, the Court allowed the appeal with costs.154 Brennan J’s 
comments are apposite:  
An appellant who prosecutes his appeal pursuant to an unconditional grant of 
leave ought not to be met at the hearing of the appeal with an application for an 
ex post facto insertion of the condition which, if inserted at the time that the 
grant was made, would have permitted him to elect between pursuing the  
appeal or not.155 
The High Court did however adopt a divergent approach in the more recent 
case of Maurice Blackburn, where — as highlighted above — the imposition of 
a first limb costs condition (costs of the appeal) was used to justify no order as 
to costs below in the ultimate judgment.156 While these cases are not strictly 
inconsistent — Sakic concerned appeal costs, Maurice Blackburn concerned 
costs below — there is logical incongruity. 
D  Practicalities 
Finally, two practical matters deserve brief discussion. Firstly, where costs 
conditions are sought by the respondent or exacted by the Court, counsel for 
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the appellant may not readily have instructions to make the necessary 
undertakings. While in some cases a short adjournment may facilitate the 
taking of instructions, to avoid difficulties the Court has developed a practice 
of granting leave subject to written undertakings being filed with the Regis-
try.157 In a 2007 case, Kirby J offered:  
I realise that your client is an international body established … in Canada and 
you may not be able to get instructions, we do not want to put you in an embar-
rassing position. Maybe we could, if we were minded to grant special leave, 
grant it subject to a condition and then you could take instructions from your 
client.158 
It is also apparent that when the costs will be paid is a matter for the parties. In 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajamanikkam, counsel 
for the respondent sought ‘that costs be paid in advance … We have had 
problems with the Commonwealth paying us in other cases where these 
orders have been made’.159 The Court did not alter its usual costs conditions, 
with Gleeson CJ quipping: ‘There is a lot of insolvency in the air at the 
moment but I did not think it affected [the Commonwealth].’160 In Minister 
for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh, Gaudron J asked: ‘Does … 
[the condition] ordinarily involve your making financial resources available in 
advance, or perhaps it does not matter.’161 Counsel for the Minister replied: ‘I 
think that it is a matter of negotiation and sometimes it does … and some-
times it is afterwards but I am sure it is a matter the solicitors can sort out.’162 
In his 1995 correspondence with Chief Justice Brennan, Jackson QC high-
lighted the difficulty of ‘an appellant not prepared to pay until the last 
moment’, in light of the expenses ‘the respondent may have to bear … until 
after a successful taxation’.163 Jackson QC proposed that an appellant might be 
required to deposit a fixed sum with the Registrar, with a portion distributed 
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to the respondent to cover disbursements. However, this proposed practice 
has not been adopted. 
VI  W I D E R  I M P L I C AT I O N S 
Finally, this paper will consider the larger relevance of the High Court’s 
practice, other mechanisms aimed at similar policy objectives and prospects 
for reform. 
A  Broader Application 
Notwithstanding the High Court’s development in Oshlack of a public interest 
costs exception, which drew support by analogy with costs-conditional special 
leave, courts have been slow to embrace any deviation from the traditional 
costs rule. Writing after his retirement from the bench, Kirby observed: 
‘[post-Oshlack] developments in Australia have indicated the exceptional 
character of the decision in that case and the persisting general disinclination 
of Australian courts to depart from the “usual rule” as to costs.’164 Just seven 
years after Oshlack, a six-member majority of the High Court were curt in 
rejecting a submission that the unsuccessful litigant should not be subject to 
adverse costs on a public interest basis: ‘The applicant commenced these 
proceedings, and his arguments have failed. The ordinary consequences as to 
costs should follow.’165 This reluctance to follow Oshlack is also evident in the 
Federal Court.166 In Nair-Marshall v Secretary, Department of Family and 
Community Services, for example, Spender J cited McHugh J’s dissent from 
Oshlack in justifying a refusal to make a special order as to costs.167 In light of 
the applicant’s financial circumstances, his Honour merely noted that ‘[i]t is, 
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of course, a matter for the respondent … to decide whether to enforce the 
costs order’.168 
Yet if the High Court is willing to depart from traditional costs principle in 
the special leave context, why not elsewhere? Many of the rationales identified 
as supporting the imposition of costs conditions are also applicable in other 
cases: the practical benefits are equally salient, questions of fairness persist 
and the nature of the court is unchanged. While the special leave process may 
provide a simple mechanism for the imposition of the conditions, the Court is 
not necessarily prevented from exercising its discretion following a decision 
by not awarding costs or imposing a special costs order favourable to an 
unsuccessful party.169 
These points are emphasised by a simple counterfactual comparison. Im-
agine two individual litigants commence proceedings on the basis of an 
established albeit dated intermediate court precedent, and both are successful 
at first instance (cases A and B respectively). The respondent, a wealthy 
corporation, appeals as it faces a number of similar disputes. In case A, the 
intermediate court is cautious and rejects the appeal. In case B, another 
intermediate court is more activist, deciding not to follow precedent and 
upholding the appeal. If the corporate respondent sought special leave in case 
A, it may be granted on a costs-conditional basis, and the individual plaintiff 
will be insulated from adverse costs whatever the outcome. In case B, if the 
individual plaintiff receives special leave but is ultimately unsuccessful, they 
will face the costs of the entire proceedings. 
In both cases, the individual plaintiff has a narrow individual interest while 
the corporate respondent has a broader interest in the jurisprudence. In both 
cases, the individual plaintiffs were successful at first instance and the 
corporate respondent sought to overturn established precedent. Yet despite 
these similarities, there would be a substantial disparity in costs outcomes. 
What is the rational basis for protecting one party from adverse costs conse-
quences while requiring the other to pay costs in their entirety, when the only 
distinction between each litigant is the decision of the intermediate court? In 
Oshlack, McHugh J in dissent suggested these two categories of cases were ‘far 
removed’ from each other, but failed to provide a cogent rationale for the 
distinction.170 
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This paper is not the appropriate place for a broader exposition on the 
benefits (or otherwise) of deviating from the traditional costs rule, whether in 
public interest litigation or elsewhere.171 However, its intended purpose is to 
highlight this dissonance in the High Court’s practice — between continuing 
the practice of costs-conditional special leave and maintaining the orthodox 
approach to costs (including via adopting a narrow interpretation of the 
Oshlack exception). For now, the question of whether the former could 
influence changing attitudes as to the latter remains in the realm of the 
hypothetical. Justice Gageler demurred: ‘I think I would not want to comment 
on that with any particularity. But it seems like an interesting question to 
explore.’172 
B  Alternative Mechanisms 
Another way to conceptualise costs-conditional special leave is as an ad hoc 
response to the lack of effective alternative mechanisms for funding such 
litigation. Kirby reflected: 
Maybe if we had a proper suitors’ fund system and ways of providing public 
funding for important legal cases, we would not need this discretion. But we do 
not have those other means, so this is a broad way in which the court can try to 
even the scales.173 
Suitors’ funds have operated for decades in several states,174 and the Federal 
Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 provides a federal equivalent. These operate to 
reimburse litigants in certain situations. The federal statute, for example, 
includes a mechanism for respondents to seek payment of their costs from the 
Commonwealth where an adverse appeal is successful175 — in other words, in 
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the exact same situations as that in which costs-conditional special leave  
can apply. 
However, these schemes have proven to be largely ineffective and un-
derutilised, partly because of the limited reimbursement available.176 Howe 
QC observed: ‘You have an Act of Parliament speaking to this general topic 
that may be getting insufficient traction.’177 The one bright spot is the  
Australian Taxation Office’s test case litigation program, which funds cases 
where there is uncertainty about taxation legislation that extends beyond a 
single taxpayer.178 In the costs-conditional special leave context, the High 
Court has shown cognisance of this program — in a 2016 hearing, Bell J said: 
‘We note that there is an understanding in relation to the costs in light of the 
applicants’ test case litigation program.’179 
The coexistence of judicial, legislative and executive activity in this sphere 
has twofold relevance. Firstly, it demonstrates that imposing costs conditions 
on special leave is not inherently necessary, because other mechanisms do 
exist to address similar policy issues. However, that costs-conditional special 
leave persists provides strong evidence of the ineffectiveness of legislative 
efforts. It might be supposed that, in the absence of renewed statutory efforts 
to address the cost of justice at this rarefied appellate level, the High Court 
will feel compelled to maintain its current approach. 
C  Reform 
The likelihood of reform to a practice that has remained largely unchanged 
since the mid-1800s appears slim. Interview participants were unanimous that 
reform was unlikely, with most also considering it unnecessary. The  
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comments of Jackson QC — asked whether, for example, a practice direction 
clarifying costs conditions might be welcomed — are representative: 
I do not think it needs a practice direction. I mean, it is a pretty simple concept, 
isn’t it? In an appropriate case the conditions are imposed. You might say: 
‘What is an appropriate case?’ They would say: ‘Well, whatever the case may be.’ 
We are not talking about Practice Directions in the Magistrates Court.180 
In 2016, the High Court announced changes to its special leave process, 
whereby ‘there will be fewer oral hearings in applications for special leave’ and 
instead more applications determined on the papers.181 The reform has made 
the aforementioned practice of written costs undertakings more common-
place; as Gordon J stated in a recent grant, ‘there should be a grant of special 
leave, subject to the applicant filing in Court within seven days a written 
undertaking [as to costs]’.182 Participants did not consider that the partial 
change in mechanism would impact the process of costs-conditional leave. It 
may, though, shift the onus further on to parties to specify their position as to 
costs in written submissions, with the absence of oral dialogue possibly 
dissuading greater intervention from the Court. In marginal cases heard on 
the papers, the Court may be deterred by the prospect of seeking further 
written submissions on the possible imposition of costs conditions, whereas 
previously the matter could be swiftly dealt with during the oral hearing. It is 
too early to ascertain any variation in the frequency of conditioned grants. 
The change in practice will limit opportunities for scrutinising the special 
leave process, emphasising the timeliness of this paper. With the bulk of 
special leave applications now being heard on the papers, it will become 
considerably more difficult to identify and analyse considerations guiding the 
exercise of the costs discretion in that context (and, indeed, special leave 
decision-making more broadly). A cloak of secrecy has been imposed upon 
the process, limiting transparency and imposing barriers to informed 
scrutiny. The research undertaken by this paper would not have been possible 
under the new process. 
There are reasons why the High Court should consider altering its ap-
proach to costs-conditional special leave. As has been demonstrated above, 
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the Court has not outlined a comprehensive and considered rationale for the 
practice, instead offering piecemeal asides littered across special leave 
transcripts. This presents two interrelated difficulties: the practice lacks 
transparency, because the Court is not explicit about why it is imposing costs-
conditional special leave, and there is no guidance controlling future exercise 
of the discretion. Even accepting that (a) there are compelling justifications 
for the practice; (b) the High Court has a special nature by virtue of its exalted 
position in the Australian legal system; and (c) special leave is in itself a 
discretionary decision, does not undermine the persuasiveness of these 
concerns. Howe QC concurred: ‘If the Court is going to resort to a default 
practice [in this context], it should be one that is overt and known to be 
supported by a line of reasoning that the litigants can see and understand 
being applied to a particular case.’183 He continued: ‘That is not to say there 
cannot be very defensible justifications for the practice, but I do think it needs 
to be articulated and any exceptions to it need to be identified.’184 
There may of course be risks attendant with a greater elucidation of costs-
conditional special leave. Deeper consideration of the practice’s unorthodoxy 
could see it become utilised only in exceptional cases, while specifying with 
more exactitude the criteria a respondent must satisfy to benefit from costs 
protection could likewise narrow its application. The comments of Black CJ 
and French J in Ruddock v Vadarlis [No 2], albeit in a different context, are 
apposite.185 While in that case criticisms of the application of ordinary costs 
rules to public interest litigation did not ‘justify a global modification’, their 
Honours observed: ‘They do however indicate the desirability of avoiding 
calcification of the discretion with rigid rules governing its exercise.’186 
Kirby, who was a frequent commentator on costs conditions during special 
leave hearings, offered a nuanced and thought-provoking perspective deserv-
ing of quotation at length. The former High Court justice said: 
Generally speaking, I believe that there should be clarity about the exercise of 
discretion. As has often been said, unbridled discretions are a form of tyranny. 
Therefore, it is desirable that judges should make as clear as they can the 
grounds on which they exercise a discretion, particularly where that discretion 
is exercised in a way different from the general rule … [Kirby then analogised 
with sentencing cases which have limited the need to provide reasons.] Those 
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were justified on the basis that it sometimes is not possible to indicate with 
greater precision the modes of thinking, and I think that is the reaction judges 
of the High Court would have to this question … 
What more can one say than the fact that this is an instance where it is to be 
applied or not to be applied? I did not feel uncomfortable about the decision on 
any occasion that I can recollect where it was applied … I do not feel uncom-
fortable with the fact that there is an exception. Just as entirely unlimited dis-
cretions are a form of tyranny, so are entirely rigid rules — that is the tyranny 
of the laws of the Medes and Persians … 
Finally, keep in mind that special leave days are very hard for the justices, as 
well as the parties and their advocates. You are under so much pressure during 
the day, and you have to do quite a few things intuitively. That limits the 
amount of time you can pause and analyse what you are doing.187 
Kirby’s comments focus attention on an entirely practical point — only so 
much attention can be paid to the broader considerations discussed in this 
paper during the maelstrom of a special leave hearing. Counsel typically have 
just 20 minutes each to persuade the bench,188 who in turn usually deliver 
their decision ex tempore or after a very brief adjournment. The character of 
these special leave proceedings is therefore exceptional, and the issue of costs 
are only a small part therein. While this is not the place for a broader exposi-
tion of such processes, these eminently human considerations do have a 
bearing on the nature of costs-conditional special leave. 
VII  CO N C LU SI O N  
From time to time, the High Court of Australia conditions grants of special 
leave to appeal on the basis that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs and 
not disturb costs below. This practice has been the subject of this paper, which 
has sought to comprehensively outline its nature, rationale and ramifications. 
The research has drawn on both a quantitative data set — created through a 
review of special leave hearing transcripts during the Gleeson and French 
Courts — and qualitative interviews with elite stakeholders. It has found that 
costs-conditional special leave is present in approximately 10% of appeals, 
predominantly those involving a public authority appellant and an individual 
litigant. By combining judicial comments and the perspectives of participants, 
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the paper has articulated three categories of motivations for the practice, 
relating to practical considerations, fairness and the nature of the High Court. 
It has concluded by highlighting the wider implications of costs-conditional 
special leave, and called for greater transparency. 
The idea for this research first germinated in 2014, following  
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Barker (‘Barker’).189 A bank manager had 
sued his employer on an unsettled legal ground — the implied contractual 
term of mutual trust and confidence. The applicant won at first instance and 
on initial appeal, before the High Court ruled for the Bank, stridently 
rejecting the existence of such a term in Australia law. Despite its comprehen-
sive legal victory, the Bank’s grant of special leave had been on a costs-
conditional basis, such that it had to foot the bill for the entire proceedings.190 
Why? Particularly given the unsettled state of the legal issue being  
determined, the dissonance between the costs outcome in Barker and the 
traditional rule seemed stark. 
Querying the nascent research topic thereafter, a colleague asked the au-
thor: ‘What’s the point? It is just a matter of practice.’ That may be true, but 
practice can be important, too, particularly when that practice can have 
million-dollar consequences. Interview participant Kirby said: ‘I do not recall 
a single instance in my 13 years’ service where the Court indicated that it was 
minded to impose [costs-conditional special leave] and the party affected 
responded that it was not prepared to agree to that term.’191 Where such 
conditions are a fait accompli — few deep-pocketed institutional litigants 
would turn down their day in the High Court — and the conditions conflict 
with the tradition costs principle, proper analysis and consideration is 
desirable. It is this task that the present paper has sought to undertake. If, in 
the recent words of the High Court, costs conditions are sometimes ‘the price 
to be paid’ for a grant of special leave,192 greater scrutiny is no pointless 
endeavour. 
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VIII   A P P E N D I X:  CO S T S -CO N D I T IO NA L  SP E C IA L  LE AV E  I N  T H E  
HI G H  CO U RT  O F  A U S T R A L IA 
Subject to the methodological caveats previously discussed, the below list 
provides citations for each case where costs-conditional special leave was 
granted by the High Court between May 1998 and January 2017. The  
complete coded data set is available on request.193 
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